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THE CASE OF DR MOHAMED HANEEF: 
AN AUSTRALIAN ‘TERRORISM DRAMA’ WITH BRITISH CONNECTIONS 
 
Dr Mark Rix1 
University of Wollongong 
 
Abstract 
This article examines the treatment of Dr Mohamed Haneef, an Indian doctor arrested 
under Australia‟s anti-terrorism legislation in July 2007 as Australian authorities 
including the Australian Federal Police, Commonwealth Director of Public 
Prosecutions, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, (wrongfully) believed that 
he was linked to the terrorist attack at Glasgow airport in June 2007. The actions and 
responses of these two agencies, and the subsequent judicial inquiry are reviewed in 
the light of the media‟s role and press coverage as the case unfolded. 
 
Keywords: Australian anti-terrorism legislation, Clarke Judicial Inquiry, Glasgow 
Airport attack, Counter-terrorism Legislation, Crimes Act 1914 
 
Introduction 
This paper begins with a brief overview of the Haneef case focusing on the major 
events and characters involved as the drama unfolded. The overview also explains the 
case‟s British connections because they are important to understanding the course 
which the case took. It then moves on to consider Australia‟s counter-terrorism 
strategy and the relevant aspects of the underpinning legislative framework, including 
the terrorism offences it specifies, using the Haneef case to highlight important 
elements of both the strategy and the framework. Here the roles and performance of 
the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Commonwealth Director of Public 
Prosecutions CDPP will be central concerns. The role that the media played in the 
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case will be a major theme running through the paper. The paper also provides a brief 
analysis of the Clarke Judicial Inquiry into the case, including the recommendations it 
produced, before concluding with some thoughts on how Australia‟s counter-terrorism 
strategy might develop in the future.  
 
 
The Case of Dr Mohamed Haneef 
Dr Mohamed Haneef, an Indian doctor working as Senior House Officer at the Gold 
Coast Hospital, Queensland, was arrested on 2 July 2007 and held without charge for 
12 days under provisions of Australia‟s anti-terrorism legislation (specifically part 1C of 
the Crimes Act, sections 23DA and 23CB). He was later charged (on 14 July) with one 
offence of recklessly providing support to a terrorist organisation on the grounds that 
his Subscriber Information Module (SIM) card was connected to failed terrorist attacks 
in Britain (contrary to section 102.7(2) of the Commonwealth Criminal Code). On 25 
July 2006, Dr Haneef had given his SIM card to his second cousin, Sabeel Ahmed, just 
as he was about to leave Britain to travel to Bangalore to visit his family before 
travelling to Australia to take up his position at the Gold Coast Hospital. The SIM card 
was due to expire in August 2006, and accordingly Dr Haneef cancelled his direct debit 
payment authorisation soon afterwards.2  
 
On 30 June 2007, Sabeel Ahmed‟s brother, Kafeel Ahmed, crashed a jeep into the 
entrance of Glasgow Airport from which he sustained serious burns leading to his 
death on 2 August 2007. The day before the Glasgow Airport attack, police had 
thwarted attempted car bombings outside two London nightclubs, in which Kafeel was 
also a central figure. Sabeel was arrested by UK police on 30 June 2007 in connection 
with the Glasgow attack and the failed London bombings, but did not tell them about 
the email he had received from Kafeel which he read and opened soon after the 
Glasgow attack (he was subsequently charged with withholding evidence). The email, 
which became known as the „Jihad confession email‟, revealed Kafeel‟s intentions to 
engage in Jihad but also demonstrated that Sabeel was completely ignorant of his 
brother‟s plans. Kafeel wrote in the email „this is the project that I was working on for 
some time now…everything else was a lie. And I hope you can all forgive me for being 
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such a good liar. It was all necessary.‟3 The officers who arrested Dr Haneef alleged 
that the SIM card that he had given to Sabeel was found in the jeep that Kafeel had 
crashed into Glasgow Airport. This was later found to be incorrect, the SIM card being 
located in Sabeel‟s home in Liverpool, England, at the time of his arrest.  
 
The story of the incorrect allegation about the SIM card was broken by Rafael Epstein 
of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation‟s AM programme on 20 July 2007.4 His 
report showed that while the UK police had known for six days before Haneef was 
charged, and soon after they began investigating Kafeel‟s activities, that the SIM card 
was not found at the scene of the Glasgow Airport attack, no attempt had been made 
by the AFP, the CDPP or the Queensland Police Service (QPS) to correct the story.5 
They also seem to have ignored the Jihad email. In other words, the AFP, the CDPP 
and, to a lesser extent, the QPS ignored evidence that Mohamed Haneef was 
innocent. Writing in The Sydney Morning Herald in April 2008, David Marr observed 
that  
[t]he case against Dr Haneef always centred on allegations that his second 
cousin Sabeel Ahmed, a doctor practising in England, was part of a terrorist 
organisation. But in the Old Bailey on Friday [11 April] Mr Justice Calvert-Smith 
accepted there was “no sign” of Ahmed “being an extremist or party to 
extremist views”.6 
 
Dr Haneef was granted bail on 16 July by Brisbane magistrate Jacquie Payne who 
noted that „[t]here was no evidence before me the SIM card was used in any terrorist 
activity‟ and „there have been no submissions to support the element of the offence 
that the defendant was reckless‟.7 Magistrate Payne adjourned the criminal 
proceedings until 31 August and Dr Haneef‟s lawyers applied to have the charge 
struck out. While the CDPP agreed that the charge should be amended, it sought to 
defer the amendment pending the committal mention date in August. Two days after 
being charged, but within hours of the magistrate‟s ruling, the Immigration Minister 
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Kevin Andrews cancelled Haneef‟s 457 work visa because he failed the character test 
of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (s501(3)), thus preventing his release from custody. 
The following day Attorney-General Philip Ruddock issued a Criminal Justice Stay 
Certificate under section 147 of the Migration Act that stopped Haneef from being 
deported requiring him to remain in detention while the criminal proceedings against 
him continued. Haneef was held in immigration detention and later home detention for 
nearly two weeks, and then allowed to return voluntarily to India on 28 July despite his 
visa remaining cancelled. However, the day before, on 27 July, the CDPP had 
withdrawn the charge against Dr Haneef on the basis that there was 
 no prospect of making out any offence against Dr Haneef in respect of what 
was alleged against him, either on the available information or the information 
likely to be produced from pending investigations.‟8  
 
The Attorney-General then accordingly cancelled the Criminal Justice Stay Certificate. 
Justice Spender of the Federal Court of Australia set aside the visa cancellation 
decision on 21 August 2007, a decision later upheld by the Full Bench of the Federal 
Court in December 2007, dismissing an appeal by Andrews.9 The Full Bench observed 
that Mr Andrews had „acted on a misapprehension of the proper construction of the 
character provisions of the Migration Act.‟10 There is no scope in this paper to examine 
in any depth the use of the Migration Act in the Haneef case. It should be noted, 
however, that while Mr Andrews did not release relevant „protected information‟ to Dr 
Haneef or to the court, he did release the same information to the media.11 Federal 
Court Justice Spender had been „[v]ery critical‟ of Andrews, observing in his judgement 
that his actions denied Dr Haneef the opportunity „to challenge the information in a 
meaningful way.‟12  
 
The basic details of the Haneef case as just outlined, point to a number of very 
important issues relating to the counter-terrorism legislation, and the criminal offences 
it specifies that were used to detain, arrest and charge Mohamed Haneef, the 
performance of the AFP and the CDPP, including their interaction, and the role of the 
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political executive. Each of these will be considered in the course of investigating the 
case.  
 
The Counter-terrorism Legislation and Associated Criminal Offences and 
Provisions 
 
The Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) 
Mohamed Haneef was arrested under subsection 3W(1) of the Crimes Act which 
authorises an arresting officer to arrest a person for an offence only if the officer has 
reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed the offence. The 
arresting officer must also have reasonable grounds for the belief that the arrest is 
necessary to ensure, among other things, the appearance by the person in a court or 
prevent the person committing another offence. Subsection 3W(2) requires that the 
arrested person be released if the arresting officer no longer has reasonable grounds 
to believe either that the person committed the offence or that holding the person is 
required to achieve such purposes.13 These statutory, or threshold tests, apply to all 
criminal offences and thus are not lowered in terrorism cases. Moreover, „[t]here is no 
special provision and test relating to terrorist offences.‟14 It is also important to realise 
that the Crimes Act makes no provision for preventative detention.  
 
Section 3(W) was inserted into the Crimes Act in 1994 (although elements of it can be 
found in earlier versions of the Act dating back to 1926). Part 1C of the Act was 
established in 1991 and Section 23CA in 2004 (inserted by the Anti-Terrorism Act 
2004 (Cth)). In his report on the Haneef Case, Justice Clarke noted that while this 
chronology of the Act‟s development might give some intuition into Parliament‟s intent 
as to which clause should take precedence in the event of inconsistency, „it is far from 
clear.‟ He also noted that there is „no clear answer‟ to the question of whether, on the 
one hand, section 3(W) prevails over 23CA or, on the other; the two sections operate 
independently of each other.15  
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Sections 23DA and 23CB: the investigation period and dead time 
While Mohamed Haneef was held in custody awaiting a charge to be brought before 
him, AFP and QPS officers who worked on the case made several (23DA) applications 
to extend the investigation period and a number of (23CB) applications for specified 
(dead) time. The two types of applications come under the Crimes Act and require 
some explanation, but it is also important to understand the process by which the 
investigating officers were able to make applications to extend the time that Haneef 
was held in custody awaiting charge and have them accepted by a magistrate. 
Accordingly, these applications and the process will be explained in tandem, beginning 
with the 23DA applications.  
 
However, it first needs to be noted that there is an inherent contradiction between 
section 3(W) of the Crimes Act, which requires that an arrested person be released if 
the investigating officer no longer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person 
has committed the offence, and sections 23DA and 23CB. These sections enable the 
police to make repeated applications for so-called „dead time‟ and, by so doing, 
suspend the investigation (questioning) period giving them more time to collect, collate 
and review evidence. As will be seen, the use made by the AFP of these inconsistent 
sections in the Haneef case demonstrates the difficulty in interpreting and applying the 
amendments to the Crimes Act that were introduced by the anti-terrorism legislation as 
outlined above. They also strongly suggest that the AFP did not have „reasonable 
grounds‟ to continue to hold Haneef in detention. The difficulties with interpretation and 
application were compounded by the submission of inaccurate, limited and poorly 
prepared evidence by the AFP.16  
 
Part 1C of the Crimes Act enables a person who has been arrested for a terrorism 
offence to be detained for a „reasonable investigation period‟ of up to but not 
exceeding four hours. However, section 23DA of the Crimes Act enables an 
application to be made to a magistrate to extend the investigation period for up to 20 
hours. Thus the maximum investigation period during which a terror suspect can be 
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detained is 24 hours. In so-called „ordinary‟ criminal cases, the initial investigation 
period of four hours can only extended once and for a maximum of eight hours. While 
section 23CA(8) disregards so-called „specific periods‟ when questioning of the 
arrested person can be „reasonably suspended or delayed‟, section 23CB allows for an 
application specifying a period of delay or suspension to be made to a magistrate. 
Such a delay or suspension „is one of the categories of “dead time” under section 
23CA(8), when the investigation period does not run.‟17 However, the „reasonable time‟ 
allowing for the „reasonable‟ suspension or delay of questioning of the suspect to be 
subtracted from the investigation period as specified in sub-paragraph 23CA(8)(m) is a 
category of dead time peculiar to terrorist cases.18 
 
The first 23DA application for an eight hour extension to the investigation or 
questioning period was made before the Brisbane Magistrates Court at 10:05am on 3 
July 2007 (Haneef had been arrested at Brisbane International Airport at about 
11:00pm the previous day). Magistrate Gordon authorised the extension on the basis 
that he was satisfied that „the investigation into the offence was being conducted 
properly and without delay and that Dr Haneef had been given the opportunity to make 
representations about the application‟ and that the reasons for the extension contained 
in the police application, including that urgent inquiries were continuing in the UK and 
other countries, showed it was necessary. Formal questioning (the first interview) of 
Haneef by Federal Agent Neil Thompson and Detective Sergeant Adam Simms of the 
QPS began at about 11:00am on 3 July and came to an end at 5:31pm that afternoon 
(a period of six-and-a-half hours including seven periods totalling 118 minutes when 
the questioning was suspended).19 
 
Release of the First Record of Interview 
This account of the AFP‟s two applications for extending (or, suspending) the 
investigation or questioning period now has to be interrupted, for the release of the first 
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record of interview by Haneef‟s legal team needs some examination and explanation. 
Hedley Thomas‟ breaking story in the first edition of The Australian on 18 July 2007 of 
the release of the first record of interview between Dr Haneef and Federal Agent 
Thompson and Detective Sergeant Simms, conducted at the AFP‟s headquarters in 
Brisbane on 3 July 2007, was a defining event in the way the case came to be played 
out.20 It also demonstrates the important role that the media came to play in the 
unfolding of the case. On the evening of 18 July, Stephen Keim SC, Haneef‟s senior 
legal counsel, disclosed that he had released the first record of interview with his 
client.  
 
The release of the first record of interview provided revealing insights into the less than 
scrupulous and professional way in which the AFP was conducting the case. It 
demonstrated, for example, that there were significant inconsistencies between the 
information that had been provided by Haneef to the police in interview and the errors 
of fact included in the AFP‟s court affidavit supporting its application to extend the 
investigation period. In the interview with the AFP, Haneef had admitted that he had 
lived in the British city of Liverpool with two other doctors but, contrary to the 
information contained in the police affidavit, neither of these was Sabeel nor Kafeel 
Ahmed. The record of interview also showed that Haneef had an explanation for his 
travel plans to Bangalore, again contrary to the AFP‟s court affidavit which stated that 
he „had no explanation‟ about having a one-way ticket.21  
 
Interviewed by Tony Eastley of the ABC‟s AM programme on the morning the 
transcript was released, AFP Commissioner Keelty claimed that the leak had 
„undermined the prosecution…[and] provided information that should never have been 
provided until the court had an opportunity to hear it for the first time and test the 
veracity of the evidence.‟22 This was an odd statement given that Keelty knew, or 
should have known, there was no evidence linking Haneef to the attempted terrorist 
attacks in Britain or to any terrorist organisation. Keelty also suggested that a contempt 
of court charge could be brought by the CDPP. For his part, Prime Minister Howard 
                                                 
20
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denounced the release with the claim that „[w]hoever has been responsible for leaking 
this documents is not trying to speed the course of justice … [they are] trying to 
frustrate the process and it should be condemned.‟23 
 
Claims that the case had been incompetently conducted by the AFP and the CDPP 
were supported by Rafael Epstein‟s story, mentioned earlier, which demonstrated that 
Dr Haneef‟s SIM card had not been found in the jeep which was crashed into Glasgow 
Airport by Kafeel, but in Sabeel‟s home. Even though the British police had been 
aware of this for six days, at no time did the AFP try to correct the error when it applied 
to have the investigation period extended.  
 
Stephen Keim justified leaking the first record of interview to the media by stating that  
[d]efence counsel don‟t normally release the records of interview of their clients 
in the media…because defence counsel don‟t normally have a document that 
indicates so clearly the very thin case that the police are claiming to have, in 
which to say that anything that my client has done was done in anything other 
than an innocent manner.24  
 
Keim also stated that „[m]y client…has a legal right to a copy of that document and that 
document was provided to him without any restrictions whatsoever. He was perfectly 
entitled, through me, to release that document.‟25 Noting that both „sides‟ had 
attempted to use the media to their advantage, Keim observed that a double standard 
had been employed by the AFP explaining that  
 
there has been a campaign of leaks, including from this document [record of 
interview], and from documents allegedly held by the police. There has been a 
campaign of selective leaks against my client and these leaks have appeared 
at least in The Daily Telegraph and in The Australian. As far as I know, no 
cabinet minister has expressed any concern about those leaks, or the impact 
that those leaks would have on the fair trial of my client.26  
 
The Attorney-General Philip Ruddock labelled the release of the record of interview as 
„inappropriate‟ and „highly unethical‟, but Keim was „unapologetic and happy to be held 
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accountable for his actions in releasing the document.‟27 The Australian reported that 
the release of the record of interview by Keim „was widely backed by leading lawyers 
yesterday amid fierce condemnation of the Attorney-General‟ while James Jupp, in a 
piece on the Haneef case in the Democratic Audit of Australia, praised the release and 
expressed gratitude for the „enterprise of Haneef‟s barrister and The Australian.‟28  
 
The Second Application to Extend the Investigation Period and the 
Applications for ‘dead time’ 
The second 23DA application was made, again before Magistrate Gordon, after 
5:00pm on 3 July because the existing 12 hour time limit for the investigation period 
was nearly up. It was made for similar reasons to the first, with Magistrate Gordon 
again accepting that these reasons showed the extension of time was necessary. He 
granted a „further and final‟ 12-hour extension of the investigation period which brought 
it to 24 hours, the maximum limit. Mohamed Haneef declined to have legal 
representation in relation to both the first and second 23DA applications.29 The 
imminent expiry of the second 23DA application effectively triggered three specified or 
dead time (23CB) applications (and a fourth, aborted, application). The first of these 
was made before Magistrate Gordon some time after 10.30pm on 3 July by Federal 
Agent John Matus and Mr Michael Rendina, Senior Lawyer, AFP Legal. The 
application was for a period of 48 hours. It should be noted, however, that the period of 
allowable dead time is not capped and is therefore virtually unlimited. Even the time 
taken to process a dead time application is counted as dead time.30 
 
In accordance with the reasons provided for under section 23CB to request dead time, 
Matus and Rendina‟s application stated that it: would assist the investigation and 
enable it to be completed; would allow for the collation and analysis of relevant 
information obtained from UK and other overseas authorities; enable the collection, 
collation and analysis of relevant material from a range of sources; and, facilitate the 
collection of relevant information from overseas places in different time zones, 
                                                 
27
 Ibid. For an analysis of the use of the media by Haneef‟s legal representatives, see Alysia 
Debowski, „Old dogs, new tricks: Public interest lawyering in an “Age of Terror”‟ (2009) 34 
Alternative Law Journal, 1, 15-20. 
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 Thomas, „Haneef dossier flawed‟; James Jupp, ‘The case of Dr Haneef’, (Discussion Paper 
13/07, Democratic Audit of Australia, Australian National University, July 2007) p.3. 
29
 Clarke,Report of the Inquiry into the Case of Dr Mohamed Haneef, p.57. 
30
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including the UK.31 Magistrate Gordon accepted all these reasons and signed the 
certificate specifying 48 hours of dead time.  
 
The second dead time application was „substantially drafted‟ by Rendina and 
contained similar information and reasons for requesting dead time as contained in the 
first application, but this time was signed by Detective Sergeant Simms. The 
application was for a period of 96 hours (four days) and was made in the chambers of 
Magistrate Gordon after 6.30pm on 5 July.32 Rendina and Simms were present, and 
AFP Commander Ramzi Jabbour, Manager Counter-Terrorism Domestic, and Federal 
Agent Michelle Gear waited outside. Gordon authorised the application at about 7.00 
the same evening. Arrangements for Peter Russo, a solicitor from the law firm Ryan 
and Bosscher, to represent Dr Haneef had been made earlier. However, Russo was 
requested to leave Gordon‟s chambers during the reading of the application because it 
contained „sensitive information‟.33  
 
A third dead time application was made before Magistrate Gordon on 9 July at about 
4.00 in the afternoon and sought a further 120 hours (five days) of dead time. Simms 
and Rendina represented the AFP and Mohamed Haneef was represented by senior 
counsel Stephen Keim. Keim opposed the third application on the basis that the „rules 
of natural justice‟ required Haneef and his legal representatives to be informed of the 
material that the AFP had placed before the magistrate. Countering Keim‟s 
submission, Rendina argued that „Part 1C of the Crimes Act did not contain a 
requirement to provide material to the arrested person and that public interest 
immunity would be claimed to prevent disclosure of the material.‟34 Magistrate Gordon 
gave qualified support to the third application, specifying a further 48 hours of dead 
time (considerably less than the five days requested by the AFP). However, he 
directed that the matter be brought back to him in two days time (11 July).  
 
A fourth 23CB application for specified or dead time was duly made on 11 July, 
seeking a further 72 hours of dead time (the remainder of the 120 hours that had been 
                                                 
31
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requested on 9 July). An „unclassified‟ statutory declaration by Detective Sergeant 
Simms of the QPS stating, amongst other things, that a further 72 hours would ‟enable 
authorities to pursue further vital investigative avenues concerning Dr Haneef‟s 
involvement in the alleged offence‟ was provided to Haneef‟s lawyers on 11 July.35 
However, citing public interest grounds, the AFP sought to prevent disclosure to 
Haneef and his lawyers of two confidential statutory declarations that contained 
„classified‟ information. While the AFP provided the Clarke Inquiry with a copy of one of 
the confidential declarations, the Inquiry only received an unsigned copy of the other 
because the AFP was unable to locate the signed copy.36 At the hearing of the fourth 
application, Haneef‟s lawyers „made an application for Magistrate Gordon to disqualify 
himself on the ground of apprehended bias…[the] application was made on the 
magistrate‟s involvement in the previous AFP applications that had been made in the 
absence of Dr Haneef.‟37 
 
The fourth dead time application was withdrawn by the AFP on 13 July, evidently 
because it believed that there was little prospect in the short term of gaining any 
further relevant information while the investigation period was suspended. Later in the 
afternoon of the same day, formal questioning (the second interview) of Dr Haneef 
began, in the presence of Mr Russo, his solicitor. The interview ran for about 15 hours 
(13-14 July), including a number of breaks, and both audio and video recordings were 
made. However, as Clarke notes in his report,  
[t]he recording equipment did not capture the resumption of the interview [after 
a suspension], from 5.01 to 5.57am, or the conclusion of the interview, between 
6.58 and 7.00 am (during which Dr Haneef was advised that he was being 
charged).38  
 
The Charge Against Haneef and the Second Record of Interview 
It was noted earlier on that Dr Haneef was finally charged on 14 July with one offence 
of recklessly providing support to a terrorist organisation on the grounds that his 
Subscriber Information Module (SIM) card was connected to failed terrorist attacks in 
Britain (contrary to section 102.7(2) of the Commonwealth Criminal Code). In his 
report, Justice Clarke outlined in detail the „Fault Elements‟ in this section that are 
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contained in chapter 2.2, division 5 of the Code. Issues relevant to these elements that 
were noted by Clarke include the meaning of intention, recklessness, negligence and 
so on. He concluded that the fault elements „were a distortion of English‟ and 
„confusing and tautologous‟ and recommended that the section be amended because 
it could lead to „judicial error‟ in its application.39 The Law Council of Australia also 
expressed a number of serious concerns with the criminal offences contained in 
division 102 of the Commonwealth Criminal Code. These concerns include: the 
terrorist organisation offences cast the net of criminal liability too widely by 
criminalising a person‟s associations, as opposed to their individual conduct‟; [existing 
principles of] „accessorial liability … draw a more appropriate line between direct and 
intentional engagement in criminal activity and peripheral association‟; [the 
criminalisation of a person‟s associations has harmful implications for freedom of 
association and expression and is likely to subject certain sections of the population to 
criminal sanction] „simply because of their familial, religious or community 
connections‟; and, [the reach of the terrorist organisation offences] is „unknown and 
unknowable … because the definition of a terrorist organisation incorporates any 
organisation, whether it is listed by regulation or not, which satisfies the broad and 
imprecise criteria set out in sub-section 102.1(a)‟.40  
 
The second record of interview was released by Haneef‟s legal representatives on 22 
August 2007, nearly a month after the charge against him was withdrawn. The second 
release raised yet more questions about the information contained in the records of 
interview and the information provided to the court and released to the media by the 
AFP. On 23 August, the day after the second release, the AFP felt compelled to deny 
publicly that it had „improperly leaked information‟ and also accused Haneef‟s lawyers 
of „running their case in the media‟. Evidently, any irony was unintended. The AFP also 
denied that its officers had selectively leaked information to damage Dr Haneef‟s case 
and reputation, claiming that the „continuing attempt by Dr Haneef‟s defence team to 
use the media to run their case is both unprofessional and inappropriate…the AFP has 
acted appropriately throughout the investigation.‟41 A month earlier, on 23 July, 
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Commissioner Keelty had had to admit that allegations linking Dr Haneef with a plot to 
bomb the Q1 skyscraper on the Gold Coast were „inaccurate‟ but also had to deny that 
the AFP was the source of the false allegations.42 However, by AFP design or not, Dr 
Haneef‟s character and reputation had again been called into question.  
 
The AFP, the CDPP and the Howard Government 
The charge against Dr Haneef was withdrawn by the CDPP on 27 July 2007. This 
caused the Howard Government immediately to seek to distance itself from the 
ignominy and recrimination rapidly gathering around the case. Mr Howard, who was 
visiting Bali at the end of July 2007, publicly called on AFP Commissioner Mick Keelty 
and Director of the CDPP Damian Bugg QC to explain the debacle. Howard told 
reporters  
[b]earing in mind that the detention of the man was undertaken by the police, 
and not at the request or encouragement of the government, and the case was 
prepared and presented by the DPP, I think that the right thing now is for those 
two men to explain the process, and explain the reasons…Prime Ministers 
don‟t conduct prosecutions.43  
 
In response, Damian Bugg had to acknowledge that „a mistake had been made‟ and 
accepted that the CDPP was responsible for one of two errors of fact put before the 
court, that is, that the notorious SIM card had been found at the scene of Kafeel‟s 
Glasgow misadventure.44 The other error of fact, that Haneef had lived with Sabeel 
and Kafeel in the UK, he blamed on the AFP. However, Keelty for his part claimed that 
the AFP had acted on the DPP‟s advice that „there was sufficient evidence to charge 
Haneef‟.45 Nevertheless, in its submission to the Clarke Inquiry, the CDPP stated that it 
had not been provided by the AFP with the record of the first interview with Haneef nor 
information about the material found on Sabeel‟s laptop that had been seized by UK 
police.46  
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Despite Bugg‟s assertions, the decision finally to charge Haneef relied on advice 
provided to the AFP by Clive Porritt of the CDPP. Porritt first met with the investigative 
team a full 10 days after Haneef‟s arrest. Moreover,  
[a]t that meeting, Porritt was informed that Haneef‟s SIM card had been found 
on Kafeel Ahmed at Glasgow - an inaccuracy which was corrected the 
following day by the AFP in the briefing paper for Porritt, but was never 
specifically drawn to his attention.‟47  
 
The briefing paper also suggested that Dr Haneef had no explanation for his travel at 
the time of his arrest and that he had lived in the same house in England with Sabeel 
and Kafeel. As noted above, these were both errors of fact. In any event, there was 
hardly a consensus view amongst the members of the investigative team that Porritt‟s 
advice warranted bringing a charge against Haneef. Indeed, the two police officers 
who conducted the first interview with Dr Haneef, Federal Agent Thompson and 
Detective Sergeant Simms believed there was not enough evidence against Dr Haneef 
to sustain a charge and refused to add their names to the charge sheet.48 Clarke 
observed that both officers „felt under considerable pressure at this time‟.49  
 
The AFP, and its Commissioner Mick Keelty, fared even less well than the CDPP in 
the wash-up of the case. In its submission to the Clarke Inquiry, the AFP claimed that 
its officers had „acted professionally‟ and were motivated only „by the need to protect 
the Australian public and public interests.‟50 However, in commenting on the role of 
AFP, particularly counter-terrorism commander Ramzi Jabbour, Clarke was far from 
flattering. Not only was the evidence used to charge Haneef „completely deficient‟, 
Jabbour, who was otherwise an „impressive, dedicated and capable‟ officer, was in this 
instance „unable to see that the evidence he regarded as highly incriminating in fact 
amounted to very little.‟51 Clarke also observed that Jabbour had „lost objectivity‟ a 
damning indictment of such a leading figure in Australia‟s „war on terror‟. As already 
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seen, and beginning with the release of the first record of interview, the Haneef case 
had already brought Keelty into the public and media spotlight. The collapse of the 
case is widely regarded as having led to his resignation from the AFP on 6 May 2009, 
which took effect on 2 September.52 Many commentators in the media held Keelty to 
be ultimately accountable for the AFP‟s leaking of incorrect and misleading information 
to the press, and for the errors of fact contained in the material provided to the CDPP 
by the AFP, all of which have already been well rehearsed in this paper.53  
 
The Haneef case naturally produced scepticism and unease in the Australian 
community about the way the in which the case had been handled by the Howard 
Government and by the AFP and the CDPP. Central to these concerns and misgivings 
were the former Government‟s apparent attempts to use the legal system and law 
enforcement agencies as vehicles for pursuing its political and ideological agenda in 
the run-up to the 2007 Federal election and the manner in which this was seen to 
compromise long-established legal principles and presumptive rights. The role of 
Immigration Minister Kevin Andrews is instructive in this respect.  
 
The Migration Act gave Andrews very wide discretion to use the Act’s character test to 
revoke the visas of non-citizens like Haneef. There is obviously no doubt that Haneef 
knew, through kinship ties, Sabeel Ahmed the brother of Kafeel who had crazily 
attacked the Glasgow Airport but whether these ties were actual associations with 
criminal suspects was at the time a matter of considerable conjecture.54 In such cases, 
the Immigration Minister would also have been able to use the even broader 
justifications of „national interest‟ or „national security‟ to cancel a visa. However, at the 
time that Haneef was granted bail and subsequently had his visa cancelled, Andrews 
did not use either of these justifications but claimed that his decision was consistent 
with secret evidence supplied to him by the AFP.55 By the time the Clarke Inquiry 
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commenced on 30 April 2008, however, it was being reported that Andrews would 
testify to the inquiry that the AFP had withheld from him the important information 
which proved that Sabeel Ahmed was not a member of a terrorist organisation and 
was not involved in the attempted London nightclub and Glasgow Airport bombings.56 
And, as noted above, Spender J of the Federal Court, in overturning the Minister‟s 
decision to cancel Haneef‟s visa, was pointedly critical of the latter‟s selective public 
release of this protected information while not being prepared to divulge any of it to the 
court.57  
 
In any event, the Minister‟s dealings with the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation (ASIO), and the advice which it gave to the government, are even more 
baffling. ASIO did not have enough evidence to issue an adverse security assessment 
in relation to Haneef – which is the equivalent of issuing a non-adverse assessment. 
Its assessment was thus inconsistent with that made by the AFP, and ASIO repeatedly 
provided this advice to the government as the affair progressed. The Minister knew of 
ASIO‟s advice at the time that he made his decision to cancel Haneef‟s visa but gave it 
„no weight‟. Instead, he claimed perversely that „he was not aware that ASIO had 
found no evidence of Haneef‟s foreknowledge of or involvement in the United Kingdom 
incidents‟ and „[s]omewhat astoundingly…said even if he had known he didn‟t think it 
would have made any difference [to his decision to cancel the doctor‟s visa].‟58 The 
Attorney General also knew of ASIO‟s advice. For ASIO‟s part, in its submission to the 
Clarke Inquiry, it stated that it had „“consistently” advised the Howard government that 
it had no evidence connecting Haneef to a British terrorist plot, days before the 
government stripped the Indian doctor of his visa.‟59 A series of emails between AFP 
officers and staff in the Minister‟s office, published in The Australian in late 2007, 
suggested the existence of, what the journalist called a „secret plan‟, to ensure that 
Haneef would remain in custody even if granted bail by Payne M. Nevertheless, a 
spokesperson for the Minister stated that „there was absolutely no deal or arrangement 
or contingency instigated or discussed by the minister or any of his staff at all, ever.‟60 
                                                 
56
 Michael McKenna, „Haneef evidence withheld‟, The Australian (Sydney), 30 April 2008 
<http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,23620701-2702,00.html>  at 31 July 2009. 
57




 Y Narushima and M Metherell, „We never suspected Haneef – ASIO‟, The Sydney Morning 
Herald (Sydney), 30 July 2008. 
60
 H Thomas, „Secret Haneef plan exposed‟, The Australian (Australia), 2 November 2007.  
 
 143 
Well-known defence barrister, Greg Barns, took a different view of the emails. He 
suggested that the emails demonstrated that „the AFP in conjunction with the 
[g]overnment were essentially completely undermining the judicial process. They were 
ripping up the doctrine of the separation of powers.‟61  
 
More worryingly from the point of view of unrestrained „executive over-reach‟, it was 
revealed in a case heard before the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
(AAT) in 2007 that representatives of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 
met on 4 July with officials from the Departments of Immigration and Citizenship and 
Foreign Affairs and Trade to discuss how the Haneef case should be handled. The 
action in the AAT was initiated by Haneef‟s lawyers in a bid to assist the Clarke Inquiry 
to procure documents relating to the case, because the Clarke Inquiry itself did not 
have the power to compel the production of such documents by government 
departments and agencies. One of the documents sought in the action was the options 
paper developed by those departments represented at the 4 July meeting, which set 
out the possible courses of action that could be taken should the AFP decide to bring 
charges against Haneef. In the view of Haneef‟s lawyers, „the involvement of Mr 
Howard‟s department raised the possibility the former Prime Minister may have 
colluded with his Immigration Minister to create a political storm similar to the Tampa 
controversy which helped the Coalition win the 2001 election.‟62 It is inconceivable that 
the Prime Minister was not briefed by his senior advisors about the meeting. While 
most of the requested documents were provided to Haneef‟s legal team, about 15 
documents that government lawyers claimed either were subject to public interest 
immunity or were exempt from freedom of information legislation were not released. 
The Department of Immigration and Citizenship refused to release the options paper to 
the AAT. 
 
Well into 2009, the Haneef case was still able to attract significant media attention not 
least because the drama which he endured continued to be entwined with that of some 
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of the other important players, most notably retired AFP Commissioner Mick Keelty.63 
At a more elevated level, the case remains for many Australians a troubling episode in 
the history of Australia‟s „war on terror‟ because it demonstrated some unpleasant and 
unwelcome facts about how the country‟s political, law enforcement and legal systems 
have been distorted by the strategy adopted to deal with the terrorism threat. These 
distortions originated in the Howard Government‟s legislative panic after the events of 
September 11, 2001 - a panic which continued for the remainder of its time in office.  
 
The Clarke Inquiry, the Media and Haneef 
As early as July 2007, at about the same time as the release of the first record of 
interview, the federal opposition and organisations such as the Australian Council for 
Civil Liberties began calling for an independent, judicial inquiry into the case. For their 
part, the Australian Greens Party wanted a Royal Commission to investigate the case 
(a Royal Commission has far more extensive coercive powers than a judicial inquiry 
including the ability to compel witnesses to give evidence and produce documents).64 
As the federal election approached, and more information relating to political 
interference in the case came to light, the calls from the opposition for an inquiry grew 
louder. On 3 November 2007, the Leader of the Opposition said that, if elected, a 
Commonwealth government formed by the Australian Labor Party would hold a full 
judicial inquiry into the Haneef case. This commitment came after it was confirmed that 
an AFP officer and staff member of the Minister had in fact developed the contingency 
(or, „secret‟) plan referred to above to ensure that Haneef would remain in custody 
under the Migration Act even if a magistrate released him. The information was 
contained in an email sent from the AFP to the Department of Immigration and 
Citizenship, and was obtained by Haneef‟s lawyers following a freedom of information 
application in their quest to have the doctor‟s visa reinstated.65  
 
Labour Commonwealth Attorney General, Robert McClelland, announced on 14 March 
2008 that John Clarke QC, a former New South Wales Supreme Court judge, would 
conduct a judicial inquiry into the Haneef affair. The Clarke Inquiry was asked to 
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examine and report on „the arrest, detention, charging, prosecution and release of 
Haneef, the cancellation of his Australian visa and issuing of a criminal justice stay 
certificate.‟66 Among its other terms of reference, the Clarke Inquiry, like the earlier 
Street Review (which was commissioned to examine the AFP‟s and ASIO‟s 
investigation into, and the failed prosecution of, terrorism suspect Izhar Ul-Haque)67, 
was to examine and report on improving co-operation, co-ordination and 
„interoperability‟ between Commonwealth agencies including the AFP, ASIO and the 
CDPP.  
 
The Clarke Inquiry was for the most part conducted in private (the opening day of the 
inquiry and a one-day public hearing on 30 April 2008 were its only public hearings). It 
was not given the power to compel witnesses to give evidence or face cross-
examination, and witnesses were not given indemnity against defamation or self-
incrimination. In all, the Clarke Inquiry made ten recommendations, the most important 
of these being „that consideration be given to the appointment of an independent 
reviewer of Commonwealth counter-terrorism laws‟.68 The Rudd Government has 
accepted this recommendation but has been slow in putting it into effect.69  
 
Commenting on the release of Clarke‟s report, just before Christmas 2008, George 
Williams noted that „it exposed in graphic detail the mishandling of the case and the 
flaws and deficiencies in the law…but made a disappointing set of recommendations.‟ 
Even though the legislation used in the Haneef case allows for the indefinite detention 
of a person who has not been charged with a criminal offence, „Clarke passed the 
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buck in finding that the legislation should be reviewed again by someone else‟.70 The 
Clarke Inquiry also drew criticism for its failure to „unearth improper political 
interference or opportunism‟. Andrew Lynch, for example, attributes this to restrictions 
on who could give evidence and what they were able or willing to say when they did. 
He points out that the Immigration Minister‟s „former chief of staff declined to provide a 
statement, while … [the Prime Minister] neither provided a statement himself nor 
granted permission for his former advisor, Jamie Fox, to do so‟.71 For his part, the then 
Attorney General, whose portfolio responsibilities included the AFP and ASIO, did 
speak to the Clarke Inquiry but only for about an hour. And, Clarke had considerable 
difficulty in gaining access to Cabinet (including National Security Committee) 
documents.  
 
In the early stages of the case, as the Australian Press Council‟s review of the press 
media‟s coverage of Haneef highlights, the media was primarily concerned with the 
narrow criminal and law and order dimensions of the case.72 Its human rights 
dimensions, and the broader implications of the counter-terrorism measures contained 
in Australia‟s terrorism law for the rights and liberties of Australians and for the rule of 
law in this country, were largely overlooked. It was only as the case proceeded and 
gathered momentum with the release of the first and second records of interview that 
these broader dimensions began to become more prominent themes in the reporting of 
the case. And, as the media began to include these broader dimensions in its 
coverage, so did other major issues become media freedom and how the various 
parties involved in the case, in particular, the Government,  its senior ministers and the 
AFP attempted to use the media to their advantage by discrediting Haneef and his 
legal counsel. The important point to be drawn from the Haneef case is that media 
scrutiny of executive government and the protection of human rights and civil liberties, 
and ultimately the protection of national security, are inextricably linked in Australia as 
in any other country. As executive government steadily grows in power in Australia and 
other democratic countries around the world, and the counter-balancing power of 
parliaments and legislatures declines in proportion, it becomes increasingly important 
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for the media and other civil society organisations to hold the executive, and the law 
enforcement, prosecuting and security agencies it oversees accountable and 
answerable for their actions.  
 
Conclusion 
The Haneef case demonstrates how the operationalisation of Australia‟s counter-
terrorism strategy can so adversely affect the human and legal rights, in effect, of any 
individual going about their day-to-day business unmotivated by any intention to plan, 
prepare for, or conspire with others to commit a terrorist act. After all, it is not very 
significant for people to give their mobile phone SIM card or a mobile phone itself to 
relatives or friends without regard to whether or not at some time in the future it might 
become involved through no fault of their own in a terrorist incident or be somehow 
entwined in a terrorist fiasco. Thus, the case also demonstrates the need for careful, 
sensitive and highly professional investigations, intelligence collection and 
prosecutions in such cases that are free from unwarranted or improper interference by 
the political executive. Any attempt by the political executive to exceed its authority in 
this way should be exposed and detailed by the media, as it was in this case. It 
remains to be seen whether the case of Dr Mohamed Haneef will turn out to be unique 
in this respect.  
